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Two agents with different priors watch a sequence unfold over time, updating their priors
about the future course of the sequence with each new observation. Blackwell and Dubins
(1962) show that the agents' opinions about the future will converge if their priors over the
sequence space are absolutely continuous: i.e., if they agree on what events are possible.
From this Kalai and Lehrer (1993) conclude that the players in a repeated game will eventually
agree about the future course of play and thus that "rational learning leads to Nash
equilibrium." We provide an alternative proof of convergence that clarifies the role of
absolute continuity and in doing so casts doubt on the relevance of the result. From the
existence of continued disagreement we construct a sequence of mutually favorable,
uncorrelated "bets." By a law of large numbers, both agents are sure that they win these bets
on average over the long run and this disagreement over what is possible violates absolute
continuity.
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Suppose two agents are watching a sequence of numbers unfold over time. Each begins with a
prior belief over the full sequence and then updates her beliefs on the future course of the
sequence as each successive coordinate is revealed. Under what conditions will the agents'
posteriors on the future of the sequence converge?
In a foundational and often cited work Blackwell and Dubins (1962) show that
convergence will obtain if agents' priors are absolutely continuous. More precisely, if the
probability measures P and Q over infinite sequences represent the agents' priors and Q is
absolutely continuous with respect to P —meaning that QE > 0 implies PE > 0 for all events
E in the sequence space—then with Q probability one, the conditional distributions of P and
Q on the future given the past (as defined within) will converge under the usual distance
metric for measures.
More recently, Kalai and Lehrer (1993) apply this result to construct the currently
preeminent model in which learning leads to Nash equilibrium. There, Blackwell and Dubins'
convergence result shows that players in an infinitely repeated game will eventually "learn" to
predict the future course of play through the process of continually updating their priors based
on the history of play. This generates the common understanding of strategic intention
necessary to obtain Nash equilibrium. In this setting the absolute continuity assumption means
that each player's prior must only assign zero probability to an event when it in fact receives
zero probability given players' actual strategies.
Since the absolute continuity assumption is critical for two fundamental results, a clear
understanding of its precise role and interpretation is imperative. On one level, the assumption
is easy to state and easier to understand: if Q thinks an event is possible, P does also. But
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behind that simplicity lies a subtle idea, difficult to interpret behaviorally. Our object in this
paper is to provide an alternative proof of Blackwell and Dubins' main theorem that makes
transparent the role of the absolute continuity assumption. In doing so we hope to convince the
reader that the result is of less relevance and efficacy than it may at first appear to be.
Blackwell and Dubins (and Kalai and Lehrer) show convergence directly in an elegant but,
we feel, unintuitive proof using Radon-Nikodym and Martingale Convergence. Our approach
is less elegant, but also less mysterious. We prove Blackwell and Dubins by contradiction,
employing no machinery more sophisticated than a law of large numbers. The basic idea of
our proof is as follows. Non-convergence means that Q thinks there is some chance that P
and Q will infinitely often disagree about the probability of future events by at least some
fixed s. Each time Q and P so disagree they can make a (zero-sum) "bet" that both expect
to win. An infinite number of disagreements means an infinite sequence of bets. The law of
large numbers then implies that (conditional on infinite s -disagreement), Q is certain that she
will win on average in the long run. P on the other hand, will be just as sure of the opposite.
We have thus translated a persistent e -disagreement into a stark disagreement about what is
and is not possible, and this violates absolute continuity.
Suppose, for example, that our agents observe a binary sequence. Both agents are sure
that the sequence is generated by i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, but agent P thinks the
Bernoulli probability is \ , while agent Q thinks the probability is $ + e. Clearly, P and Q •
do not converge in the sense of Blackwell and Dubins. Where then is the event defeating Q 's
absolute continuity with respect to P ? In this simple example, Q is certain that the average
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frequency of ones in the Bernoulli trials will converge to $ + s, while P , who thinks it must
converge to \ , regards this as impossible.
This same idea can be restated in terms of the betting discussed above. Q always thinks it
s -more likely than P that the next element is a one. We can then structure a bet in which
both expect to win a dollar in every period: Q pays P x if the next element is a one and y





Applying the law of large numbers, Q believes for sure that P will pay her one on average
over the long term, while P thinks there is no chance of this.
Another way to understand this example, and the strength of absolute continuity generally,
is in terms of convergent statistics. Absolute continuity says that whenever Q thinks an event
is possible, P must agree. Thus any sequence of random variables that converges to some
value P -almost everywhere must converge to the same value Q -almost everywhere. In a
sense then, P and Q must agree on all P-a.s. convergent "statistics." This is an extremely
strict requirement because the entire universe of all conceivable P -convergent statistics is on
trial. In this example, the average number of Bernoulli ones, the mean of the sequence, is a
P -convergent statistic upon which P and Q disagree.
In this paper we show how the betting approach generalizes to arbitrary probabilities. In
effect we show that it is always possible to tailor a convergent statistic to exploit any persistent
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disagreement between P and Q regarding the continuation of the game. Importantly, the
statistic is quite intuitively related to the disagreement to which it was tailored. It is essentially
P 's time-average winnings in a non-overlapping sequence of bets made against Q when the
two disagree by at least s. Since both players always expect to win each bet, they must both
be sure that they will win on average over the long run. The main text constructs bets for the
simplest case in which each factor of the sequence space is finite and both P and Q place
positive measure on every partial history. An appendix shows that our construction
generalizes to countably generated coordinate spaces, such as 9T with the Borel sets.
Before moving forward with our main argument, it is worth pausing to switch to an
alternate perspective that helps illustrate the inherent implausibility of absolute continuity and
convergence itself. Both the assumption of absolute continuity and the convergence theorem
concentrate on the "global" measure that assigns probabilities to an uncountable number of
infinite-length histories. It is easier to understand convergence from a "local" perspective.
This entails first viewing histories as paths through an infinite length tree and partial histories
as nodes in this tree and next, viewing probabilities on this tree as collections of "local"
measures, one for each node. These local measures tell us the probability of each branch
emanating from the node. We constructed the priors in our example locally. Since the
measures there were i.i.d., all nodes had the same local measure: e.g., (\,j) for P. The local
and global perspectives are equivalent (for the measures considered by Blackwell and Dubins1).
Bayes' rule is merely the "isomorphism" that translates the global language of priors into the
local language of collections of nodal measures. Once Bayes' rule is seen in this light, its
apparent power for generating learning is much diminished.
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Indeed, from the local perspective, there is little reason to expect merging of opinions,
which would require our two agents come to agree on the likelihood of the current draw.
Speaking informally, suppose we constructed P by randomly assigning a local measure to
each node and then repeated the experiment to construct Q . Why would we ever expect the
collections of local measures to begin to look the same for nodes far enough out in the tree?
Absolute continuity is thus much more than a mere regularity condition; it imposes a great deal
of structure on the priors. Our object in this paper is show how such a seemingly plausible
assumption produces such implausible results.
1. FRAMEWORK
Let each X(i), i = 1,2,... be a finite set.2 Let X = |"J° X(i) be the set of (full) histories,
Xn = YYM X(i) the set of (partial) histories (up to n) and X" = J~[*n+i -*tO • ^ s e t o f
continuations (from n). It is helpful to think of X as the set of paths through an infinite tree.
Xn would then represent the set of all nodes of rank n, and X" the subtree following each
node in Xn. We endow each of X, Xn, X" with their usual product a -algebras. In
particular, write %, Sn and Sn for the cr-algebras on X, Xn and X", respectively. (Sn is
trivial but it is helpful to have the notation.) We denote the typical partial history as hn eXn.
The partial history of a given full history x is written hn(x), which is just the projection map
k.:X->Xm.
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For any measures R and S on a given measurable space (Y,/t), define the distance
R-S\ = supA&J\R(A)-S(A)\. We say that R is absolutely continuous with respect to S ,
written R « S , if R(A) > 0 implies S(A) > 0. Let P and Q be probability measures on X
such that3 P(hn),Q(hn) > 0 for all4 /*„. Thus we may define for each history, hn, P 's
conditional distribution on the future X" given the past hn, Pn(hn):&" - • 9?, s.t.
P"(/2j(£) = Z?(jf,lx£|/zM), for all events £ on Jf\ Define <2"W similarly. In terms of a
tree, P"(hn) and Q"(hn) are measures on the subtree following node /*„ induced by P and 2 •
For the convenience of the reader, we restate Blackwell and Dubins' convergence theorem
for the special case we are considering.5
Theorem 1 [Blackwell and Dubins' (1962)]: If Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P,
then for every history x e X in some set of Q probability 1, the distance
Pn(hn(x)) - Qn(hn(x)^ between P and Q 's conditional distributions on the future given the
past converges to zero as n goes to infinity.
2. CONTRADICTING CONVERGENCE
The first step in our proof by contradiction is to illuminate what it means for the
conditional probabilities of P and Q to not converge in the sense of Blackwell and Dubins.
Simply contradicting Theorem 1 yields: for each infinite history x in some set of positive Q
measure there exists an ex>0 such that for infinitely many n, we can find a continuation
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")- Q"{hn{X)){D") > £ x - In Other WOrdS' f01" eaCh SUChevent D" eg" with
x there is persistent sx -disagreement. Let {?" represent the collection of (finite) cylinders in
the continuation X": sets of the form / I X T C I " , where m > n and A c F T , AY/).
Standard arguments establish that we lose no generality if, in contradicting convergence, we 1)
take sx uniformly over x and 2) take the continuation events on which P and Q disagree to
be cylinders. This is stated formally in the following lemma, the proof of which is relegated to
an appendix.
Lemma 1 [Contradicting Convergence]: Suppose that along some set of histories with
positive Q measure Pn(hn(xfj - Q"(hn(x)i does no[ converge to zero. Then there exists an
£>0 and a set D of positive Q measure, such that along all infinite histories x in D there
are infinitely many times n at which we can find a cylinder Cn e&n in the continuation from
n with Pn(h(x))(Cn)-Qn(h(x))iC")\>£.
The two components of this lemma correspond to the two conditions that we will require
to apply a law of large numbers. The fact that cylinder events resolve in finite time will allow
us to construct a sequences of bets which do not overlap in time and are thus uncorrelated.
The uniformity in s allows a uniform bound on the "stakes" of the bets.
3. DEFINING THE SEQUENCE OF BETS
From the infinite sequence of e -disagreements on cylinders along each path in D, we
construct a sequence of uncorrelated zero-sum "bets" each of which P and Q both expect to
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win. A law of large numbers translates this persistent difference in expectation into a
difference of opinion about what long run average outcomes are possible. Differing views
about what is possible rule out absolute continuity.
The construction of these bets requires a fair amount of notation, but is quite intuitive, and
can be seen as a three-part generalization of the simple example in the introduction. The first
generalization is to bets that are uncorrelated, as opposed to independent. This poses no
problem as we can simply apply a different law of large numbers. The second generalization
accounts for the fact that infinite s -disagreement occurs only along a subset of paths—this
turns out to be just a matter of bookkeeping. The last generalization allows for the possibility
that bets take different amounts of time to resolve. To deal with this we convert from calendar
time, n, to an event time, k, based on the resolution times of the bets.
We will say that there is a (s-) bet at node hn when P"(hn)- Q"(hn)\ > s. For all nodes
hn that have bets, we arbitrarily select (by the axiom of choice) a cylinder event Ch e &n
satisfying Pn (hn )[CK) - Qn (hn )(Chn )| > e and define the bet at node hn to be the following
random variable on the continuation: BK:X" -> 9?, s.t.
1 [2-(p + q), yeCK
where we abbreviate as p = Pn{hn)(Chn) and q = Qn(hn)(CK). By convention, if there is no bet
at hn, we set BK = 0. We chose these two particular values for Bh because they imply that
the expected value of BK is one under Pn{hn) and is negative one under Qn(hn).
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Where there is s -disagreement we think of BK as a bet between P and Q as a result of
their (conditional) disagreement about whether CK will occur in the continuation. The
realized value of Bh is the net payment from Q to P. Suppose, for example, that P thinks
Ch is at least s more likely than does Q. The bet says that Q pays P the amount
———— if Ch occurs and "pays" the negative amount -——- if not, and each player
p-q " p-q
expects to win one dollar. Importantly, since \p - q\ > e the stakes of all bets are uniformly
bounded across all nodes ln ' Bu
We have defined bets at each node where it is possible: next we assemble a sequence of
bets so that the bet upon cylinders do not overlap in time. This will guarantee that the
sequence of bets is uncorrelated (in a particular sense) so that we can apply a law of large
numbers. Define r\(x), the time of the first bet to be the date of the first node along x that has
a bet. If there is no bet at any node along JC, we set n^x) - <x>. We now "patch together" the
nodal bets described above to obtain the first bet in our constructed sequence. Let cn[x) be
the continuation of history x, i.e. the projection of x onto Xn. If n^x) = n < oo, set theirs*
bet B^(x) = \(,)(cff(x)) • If n](x) = co we let Bx(x) = 0 . Thus, for any history x along which
there is some bet, B^x) is the outcome of the first such bet: i.e. the net payment from Q to
P. If there is no bet along x, Bl(x) = 0.
Recall that we have associated a particular cylinder in the continuation with each node
having a bet. As a cylinder this event may be expressed as A^ x Xr+X, for some r, where
10
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Arn c X(n + l)x...x X(r). If hn has a bet, the resolution time rK of the bet at hn is defined to
be the smallest such r . The resolution time, rx{x), of the first bet is rK at the first betting
node, \{x) along x . If there is no first betting node along x (i.e., «,(*) = oo), set /;(*) = co .
In order to complete an inductive definition, suppose that rk_x(x),nk_x(x),Bk_x(x) have
already been defined. The time of the Kh bet, nk(x), will be the smallest n such that
n > rk_x{x) and there is a bet at hn(x). Set nk(x) = <x> if there is no such n, either because
rk_x(x) = oo or because there is no bet at any node along x following time rk_x(x) . Then define
Bk(x) and rk(x) in the same way as Bx(x) and rx(x).
It should be noted that along all histories x in the set D of persistent s -disagreements, as
described in Lemma 1, there is a non-degenerate bet for all k. Since there are infinite e
disagreements along every history x e D . w e can always find yet another point of
disagreement after the resolution of the last bet. We do not use all of the infinity of bets along
history x\ just a subsequence constructed so that the k-7th bet is resolved before the A:* bet is
made.
4. APPLYING THE L A W OF L A R G E N U M B E R S .
We have created a sequence BX,B2,... of random variables on X where each Bk describes
the k* bet made between P and Q. The Bk 's are not independent, because the bet upon
event and its probabilities under P and Q depend on the history to date. However, they are
essentially uncorrelated: their expectation (conditional on being non-degenerate) is the same
across all histories up to k (one for P and negative one for Q)\ in particular, it is the same
11
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across all realizations of Bv...,Bk_K. A slight modification of the Bk 's will make them truly
uncorrelated.
For all k , let Bpk and Bf be defined from Bk by setting Bk(x) = Bf(x) = Bk(x),
wherever Bk(x) * 0 and Bk(x) = -Bf(x) = 1, wherever, Bk(x) = 0 . Note that on the set D of
infinite s -disagreements, Bk = Bf = Bk for all k.
As is well known, random variables Z and Y are uncorrelated if the expected value of Z
conditional on Y is constant across values for Y: i.e. E[z\Y= y] is constant across y ; for
then E[ZY] = ]£ Pr(F = ^)£[ZF|7 = y] = J ] y Pr(7 = ^)£[Z)r = y] = £[Z]£[y]. Thus since
the &* bet is made after the k-j* bet is resolved and the expectation of the k * bet from
when it is made is always the same, the Bk are P -uncorrelated: Ep\Bk Bpk_j = b| = 1, for all b.
Similarly, the Bj? are Q - uncorrelated.6 Further, since for each hn, Bh < J the same
uniform bound applies to both Bk and Bf, for all k. These two conditions, orthogonality
and uniform boundedness, are more than enough to apply a law of large numbers7 (see, e.g.
Stokey and Lucas8 (1989), p. 422) This enables us to conclude that T^k=xBk converges to
one P -almost surely and ^^k=lBf converges to negative one Q almost surely. Now
consider the event that we are in D and P 's average net winnings Y^ _ Bk go to -1: i.e. the
event Dn{±^*mlBk -> - l } . Since Bpk = Bf = Bk on D, and Q(D) > 0, Q thinks this event
is possible (indeed certain, conditional on D):
12
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P on the other hand regards this event as impossible since she is certain that her average
winnings converge to one on D:
We conclude that Q is not absolutely continuous with respect to P .
5. NOTES AND EXAMPLES
5.1 Countable Intuition in an Uncountable Setting
Perhaps the reason that the absolute continuity assumption has gained such currency in the
literature is that it is so plausible in a finite, or even countable setting. Even the stronger
assumption that both players regard each state as at least possible seems attractive, since all
this rules out is dogmatism. But it would be a mistake to carry this intuition into the
necessarily uncountable setting that is relevant here: obviously, in this case some events must
receive zero measure.
In the finite case every measure is absolutely continuous with respect to the uniform
measure, while this is far from the case in the uncountable setting. The measure built from
nodal probabilities of (y,y) in our introductory example, for instance, is the uniform measure
on binary sequences. And indeed we used it as an example because it is trivial to find a
measure that is not absolutely continuous with respect to it. Thus, the uniform measure, which
13
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we think of as so "open-minded" in the finite case is highly "opinionated" in the uncountable
setting.
5.2 Countable Restrictions in X
It has been proposed in several contexts that Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result be
applied to the special case of measures that have the same countable support in X. Here
absolute continuity is satisfied if both P and Q put positive weight on all histories in this
common support, which is only possible since the support is countable. Given this set-up
absolute continuity seems to be a reasonable assumption; but the problem has just been
transferred to the set-up itself. For this approach begs the question of which set should serve
as common support. How should we suppose that the players in a repeated game, for instance,
are able to agree a priori on one set of strategies from among the uncountable multitude of
such subsets? The very assumption of so much initial agreement accomplishes most of the
learning by itself.
In the case of repeated games, the countable restriction is accomplished if players
understand that all strategies are drawn from some given countable set. In this case, the resort
to countable supports is particularly unpromising. For as Nachbar (1996) shows there is no
guarantee that the best responses to any given countable subset will lie in that set.
5.3 The Grain of Truth.
Kalai and Lehrer support the assumption of absolute continuity with reference to a
stronger assumption called the "the grain of truth." In our context this means that P may be
written as a convex combination of Q and any other measure on X. (Note that the functional
convex combination of two probability measures is as well a probability measure.)
14
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Interpreting Q as the "true" measure on X and P as an observer's beliefs, the observer's
beliefs must contain a "grain of truth."
Our objection to this is very closely related to our objection to the countable restriction
discussed above. For if there were only a countable number of probability measures under
consideration, not assigning at least some small probability to each would seem dogmatic. But
when, as here, the number of possible measures on X is uncountable, we run into the same
problem as above. In order for the grain of truth criterion to hold, we have to know that the
true measure lies within a particular countable subset of the uncountable number of
possibilities. This means that we must know a great deal even before observing the first
element of the true sequence.9
6. CONCLUSION
We have provided a proof of Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result that demystifies
the role of absolute continuity in a way that we believe makes the result less compelling.
Essentially we have provided an interpretation of the lack of absolute continuity in terms of
persistent disagreement. Lacking any independent behavioral interpretation, absolute
continuity becomes the economic and behavioral equivalent of convergence.
In general, we feel that there is little promise in attempting to derive convergence from
"regularity" conditions on priors. A shift to the "local perspective" laid out in the
introduction makes clear that convergence simply does not follow from the structure of the
problem. We do not conclude from this, however, that the research program started by
Blackwell and Dubins and then continued by Kalai and Lehrer should be abandoned, only that
15
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its focus should shift. The most fruitful approach, in our view, would be to recognize that
results require genuine, substantive restrictions on beliefs and then propose restrictions that are
explicitly grounded in our best understanding of human behavior.
7. APPENDIX: P R O O F OF LEMMA 1
The fact that s may be chosen uniformly follows from standard arguments and the continuity
of probability measures. Let D' be the positive Q measure set of infinite histories, x, with
an sx and infinitely many n at which we can find a continuation event D" e g" with
Pn(hn(x))(D") - Qn(hn(x))(Dn)\ > ex. Let D} be the subset of D' such that for infinitely
many n, we can find a continuation event Dn e2"1 with P"(hn(x))(Dn) - Qn(hn(x))(Dn)\ > j .
Then D} t D' and so by continuity of probabilities, Q(Df)>0 implies Q(Dj) > 0 for large
enough ; . Therefore, for some j large enough, we can set D = D} and s = j .
It remains to show that we may restrict attention to disagreements over cylinders. This
follows from the fact that the distance norm used by Blackwell and Dubins is equivalently
defined by taking the supremum only over a generating algebra (here the cylinders): that is, if
the algebra ?0 generates the a -algebra ? , in some measurable space (Q,?) , then
P - Q\ = suplP(S) - Q{S)\ = suplPfS) - Q(S)\. This, in turn, may be deduced directly from
Halmos' Monotone Class Theorem (Billingsley (1995), p. 43), or alternatively from a well-
known "Approximation Theorem" (See, e.g., Ash p. 20): for every e > 0 and every S G ? ,
there exists A e?° s.t. P(SAA) <e, where SAA = (S- A)v(A-S) . •
16
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8. APPENDIX: GENERALIZATION TO UNCOUNTABLE COORDINATE SPACES (WITH
COUNTABLY GENERATED G -ALGEBRAS)
The logic for the uncountable case is the same as for the finite case analyzed in the body of
the paper. The only difficulty is insuring that the constructed bets Bk are measurable
functions. For the finite case we simply selected a bet at each partial history having one, and
from these "nodal bets" we constructed the Bk sequence. In the uncountable case, we can
still make such a selection, by the axiom of choice. The problem is that the selection must be
made in such manner that the bets Bk are % -measurable functions. Here we show how this is
possible when each coordinate a -algebra is countably generated—as the Borel sets on 9?, 9T ,
or even SR00.
As in Blackwell and Dubins, we restrict attention to probabilities on (X,S) that can be
constructed from measures on the future conditional on each partial history. To state this
restriction formally, we restate their
Definition 1 [Blackwell and Dubins (1962)]: A probability measure P on (X,S) is
predictive if for every n > 1, there exists a conditional distribution P" for the future X"
given the past; that is, if there exists a function P"(xl,...,xn)(E) where x,,...,*„ ranges over
Xn and E ranges over &n with the usual three properties: P"(xl,...,xn)(E) is Sn-
measurable for fixed E\ is a probability distribution on (X",gn) for fixed (x,,...,xw); and
for bounded S -measurable <f>
17
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\<P dP = l(l<f(xx,...,xn,zn+l,zn+2...) dP"{xx,...,xn)) dPn, (2)
where Pn is the marginal distribution of P on {XH,Gn); that is, Pn(A) = P(A X X"), for all
Though not all probability spaces are predictive, any probability measure on the Borel Sets
with respect to a complete separable measure space will be (See e.g. Ash p. 266, paragraph 2).
Next we restate Blackwell and Dubins' convergence result:
Theorem 2 [Blackwell and Dubins' "Main Theorem "]: Suppose that P is predictive on
(X,S) and that Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P. Then for each conditional
distribution Pn of the future given the past with respect to P, there exists a conditional
distribution Q" of the future given the past with respect to Q such that, with the exception of
a set of histories (x, ,...,*„, xn+l,...) of Q -probability 0, the distance between P" (xx,..., xn)
and Q"(xl,...,xn) converges to 0 as n converges to oo.
We add an additional assumption to prove a stronger result:
Assumption 1: Each coordinate S(i) i = 1,2,... is countably generated.
Theorem 3: Suppose that P is predictive on (X,&) and that Q is absolutely continuous
with respect to P. Then for each conditional distribution P" of the future given the past
with respect to P and all conditional distributions Q" of the future given the past with respect
18
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to Q, with the exception of a set of histories (x],...,xn,xn+x,...) of Q -probability 0, the
distance between Pn{xx,...,xn) and g" (*,,...,*„) converges to 0 as n converges to GO.
The assumption that S(i) is countably generated is weaker than it may at first seem: as
noted above the Borel sets on 9T , even SR" are countably generated. Thus, generation by a
countable collection of sets is a much weaker condition than generation by a countable
partition, the assumption imposed by Kalai and Lehrer (1993) in their proof of Blackwell and
Dubins type convergence.
8.1 Contradicting Blackwell and Dubins Convergence within a Countable Collection of
Continuation Events
Let ?(i) be the smallest algebra containing the countable collection of subsets generating
S(i). ?(/) will also be countable. Let ?" be the collection of all finite disjoint unions of sets
that may be expressed as F(n + l)x...xF(m)x X(m + \)x... for any m>n and any F(y)e
all j = n +1,..., m. By standard techniques:
Lemma 2: ?n is a countable algebra on the continuation space Xn and generates the
continuation <J -algebra &n.
By the same reasoning as in Lemma 1 we obtain the following restatement of non-
convergence:
19
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Lemma 3: Suppose that for all x on some set of Q positive measure, there exists sx > 0 and
infinitely many n such that we can find a continuation event D" eg"1 satisfying
Pn(x],...,xn)(D")-Q"(xl,...,xn)(D")>sx. Then there exists an s>0 such that for all x on
some set D of Q positive measure there exist infinitely many n such that we can find an
event F e9" suchthat \P"(xl,...,xn)(F)-Q"(xl,...,xn)(F)\> e.
8.2 Structuring the Bets
8.2.1 A Bet for Each Event in 9" at each Partial History x,,...,xH
The first step is to define a bet for each time n, partial history xx,...,xn and each element
of 9" on which P and Q disagree by at least s. For each n = 1,2,..., enumerate 9" as
{F ;} . Set PZ:X->91 s.t. PZ(x) = PH(hH(x)\FZ). Define Qnm in the same manner. The
functions P^ and Q"m are Sn -measurable by Definition 1 and the measurability of the
projection hn.
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To aid interpretation we will say that there is a bet at partial history xx,...,xn (alternatively
along history x at time n) on the event F", if \P^(x) - Q"m(x)\ > s. (Note the slight abuse of
notation.)
We will also define the (non random) resolution time r"t of the mth bet at time n. Since
F"t is the disjoint union of finite rectangles, there exists r such that F"t may be expressed as a
union of sets of the form F(n + l)x...xF(r) x X(r + l)x..., where F(i) e ? ( / ) , all n<i<r . Let
r"t > n be the smallest such r for F"t . Then Sh where n = r"t, which may be written g^ , is
the <r -algebra describing what is known about x when the 111th bet at time n is resolved.
Lemma 4 [Properties of the Bnm]:
i) All Bnm are %^ -measurable {a fortiori % -measurable) functions.
ii) If there is a bet at partial history xx,...,xn on the event F^, then
Bnm(Xl,...,xn,zn+l,zn+2...) dPn(Xl,...,xn) = \
JBnm(xl,...,xn,zn+l,zn+2...) dQn(x{,...,xn) = - 1 .
Hi) The Bnm are uniformly bounded: in particular, \fm,n, Bnm
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8.2.2 A Measurable Selection of Bets for Each Time n
The second step is to select measurably a bet for each partial history. We will arbitrarily
choose the first event in our enumeration of ?" for which a bet exists. Thus the random bet-
upon event for n is mn:X -» N u{oo} s.t.
Note that mn(x) = oo if there's no bet at *,,...,*„.
Lemma 5: For all n = 1,2,... the random bet-upon event at time n, mn\X'-*NKJ {OO} is a
measurable (a fortiori & -measurable) Junction.12
Proof: Fix m and n. Anm -{(*„. . . ,<) eXn\ \pn(Xl,...,xn)(F:)-Qn(Xl,...,xn)(F:)\>s] is
ff(l)x...xff(n)-measurable subset of Xn by Definition 1. Then
K = {|C ~Qm\ >£} = A", x X(n + \)x... is a ^-measurable set. Therefore, given n, Vw,
{mn = m } = Enm-\Jm<mEnm, and {mn = oo} = -\J°^Enm, are Sn-measurable sets.
8.2.3 Defining the Sequence of Bets
Lastly, we define the sequence of bets themselves. Define the random time of the first bet
n{. X -+ N\J {oo} s.t.
nx(x) = sup[« e#|V«' < n,\/m\P*(x)-Qnm(x)\ < f} = sup{« GA |^VAJ' < n,mn.(x) = oo}
Note that if there is no bet along x at time n', then mn,(x) = oo.
22
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 21 21 n=tiAm=m\"m
where /MI=MAWB=W is the indicator function for the set {mn(x) = m and nx(x) = n]. For each
history x we have assigned at most one first bet time «i(^): all histories that have bets at some
point n are assigned a betting time. Further, for each history x and its finite betting time
«,(*) = n < oo, should it have one, we have assigned one bet upon event mn(x) < <x>. Thus
/„
 WAIB|f_M equals one for at most one n,m pair. Thus for each history x, our summation
formulation either selects a unique bet, or if there is none, equals zero.




The random time of the k?h bet is the first time after resolution of the k -1 th bet that a bet
exists. First, set
nk(x) - sup{«« > rk_x(x) and \fn' s.t. n' >^_,(x) and n' < n,mn,(x) = ooj .
Then just as for k = 1, set
00 00
D _ Dnk _ X"1 X"1 T ft"
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The next two results concern the measurability of the objects defined in this subsection.
Lemma 6 [Measurability of Bets and Times]: For all bets k = 1,2,... and all times
n- 1,2,...both \nk =n\ and {rk =n] are Sn-measurable sets.
Proof: For all times n, define r":X^> Nv{ao] s.t. r" =^m_^mn=mrm • Since mn is Sn-
measurable (Lemma 5), so is r".
k = l : Since for all n, \mn < oo} is a Sn-measurable set,
{nx = n} = {mn < oo} - ( J \mn, < oo} is also a Sn -measurable set. Thus
{r, = n} = |JM,<rt[{«i = n'}n[r"' = «}] is a g*M -measurable set.
k^l^k: Suppose that for all n, \rk_x = «} is a g*M -measurable set. Combining with
Lemma 5 yields that {nk = « } = (JW,, /I[fc-, =n'}n[{mn < ° ° } - U ^ < w K " < 0 0 }]] i s a ^,"
measurable set. Therefore, {rA = «} = (Jw(</J[{«* = n'}n {r" = «}] is also a ^M -measurable
set. I
Corollary 1: For all bets k = 1,2,..., the betting time nk, the resolution time rk and the bet
Bk itself are & -measurable functions.
As in the text, define for all = 1,2,... k, Bkp:X->W. and 5f :X-+ <K s.t.
B[=\Bk "*<0° , B?=\Bk "k<C°.
1 «. = oo - 1 n. = oo
24
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Lemma 7 [Properties of Bk for Application of Law of Large Numbers]:
i) Bk and so Bk and Bf are uniformly bounded across k
ii) Ep[Bpk] = 1 and EQ[Bj>] = - 1 , all k = 1,2,...
Hi) covP[Bkp,Bp] = covQ[Bk3,Bf] = 0, all j,k = l,2,...;j*k,
iv) {Bk}, {Bk} and {#f} coincide on D, the set of histories along which there are
infinitely many e -disagreements.
Proof: We consider only B[ ; the arguments for 5f are the same, i) follows immediately
from the uniform boundedness of the Bnm. iv) is clear from the definition of Bk .
ill: Roughly, wherever there is an n* bet, its conditional expected value is one by
construction. By definition of B[ , the conditional expected value is also one on the set of
histories which have no n* bet. The following argument shows how to aggregate across the
countable number of n, m pairs to obtain the unconditional expected value.
Since J Bk dP = P[nk = oo] + J Bk dP , it suffices to show JBkdP = P[nk < oo]. By the
bounded convergence theorem:
\Bt dP = \f^hk,^,mB"m dP = fJfd\hl,n^,mBl dP
n=\ m=\ n=\ m=\
n=\ m=\
By Lemma 6, Ink=nAmn=m is Sn -measurable and thus constant with respect to the arguments
zn+,, zn+2,.... Thus, we continue
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«=1 /w=l
Now In nAIHii=m(x) = 1 implies a fortiori that there is a bet along x at time n on FJ and so
" (x,,..., xn) = 1. Thus, we continue
n=\
K = « and wM < oo] =
W=l
m|: We show the result for j = k +1. The same argument applies for any j>k. First we
observe that
Hence, it suffices to show J InkX=nBk{Bk+{ -\)dP = 0 for arbitrary « .
The first step is to show that if we restrict attention to x whose k + 1th bet is at n , then the
A;* bet is a Sn -measurable function. More precisely, Ink+l=iiBk is a Sn -measurable function
since
/ -B = I -V* V°° / Bn = I -V" V / 5"
and \/m,n, s.t. n,r^ < n , {nk+x = n}, {nk = n) and {mn = m} are all ^-measurable sets and
by Lemma 4, Bnm\sdiSn -measurable function.
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The fact that Ink+l=fiBk is a Sn -measurable function allows us to "pull out" Bk from the
inside integral when parsing across n length histories:
^ , . . . ^ , ^^ , . . . ) dPn(xx,...,Xfi)-\) dPn=0.
To see that the last line is zero, note that when nk+x{x) = n , there is a bet at time n along x on
the n^ event and so
JBk+l(xl,...,xn,zH+l,...) dPH(xl,...,xfi) = Jfl^x,,...,*,,,^,,...) dP*(xl,...,xll) = \ by Lemma 4.
The last step is to apply the law of large numbers for uncorrelated random variables as in
the main text to obtain the result in Theorem 3.B
27
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10. NOTES
* We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell, Subir Bose, Phoebus Dhrymes, Prajit Dutta, Ehud
Lehrer, Andrew Newman, and the associate editor and referees of a previous version.
1
 Blackwell and Dubins' restrict attention to probability measures that are fully described by a
collection of nodal measures (See the appendix). Conversely, every collection of nodal
measures produces a (unique) measure on full paths (See, e.g. Ash (1972), p. 109).
2
 See the appendix for the general case.
3
 Here and in the next sentence, we abuse notation in the usual manner by viewing hn as both
an element of the partial histories Xn and a subset of the full histories X.
4
 See the appendix for the general case.
5
 See the appendix for the general case.
6
 This is shown for the more general case in the appendix.
7
 An alternative approach here is to: 1) recognize that, with appropriate choice of filtration,
Bk is a submartingale difference sequence for P and a supermartingale difference sequence
for Q, 2) consider the Doob decompositions (See, e.g. Shiryaev, p. 482) of the corresponding
sub- and supermartingales, and 3) apply the martingale law of large numbers (e.g. Shiryaev,
p. 501) to the martingale components of these decompositions. Note that this "martingale
approach" to our proof does not call upon Doob's martingale convergence result, as do the
proofs in Blackwell and Dubins and Kalai and Lehrer. In particular the martingale law of
large numbers follows from martingale inequalities.
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8
 There seems to be an error in the fourth line from the end of the proof in this text, which
does not affect the truth of the proposition. Apparently, it should read:
" ju(Zk>k2s)<4M/2 2 , all *>0 ,a l l k."
9
 While the "Grain of Truth" assumption only makes sense following restriction to a countable
set of possible measures, there exist certain kinds of restrictions to uncountable sets in which
the more general absolute continuity assumption is reasonable. The classic example, as
pointed out by Blackwell and Dubins, is restriction to the class of measures that are i.i.d. with
a finite number of parameters.
10
 That is to say, S(i) is the smallest a -algebra containing some countable collection of
subsets of X(i).
11
 Indeed, the value of the portion of Blackwell and Dubins' theorem that is not contained in
our own result is unclear: the fact there exists a version of Q" that converges to a given
version of P" is difficult to interpret when each S{i) is not countably generated. For when
the B(i) are not countably generated, two different pairs of choices Pn , Q" and P", Q" may
yield distance functions \Pn(xv...,xn)-Qn(xx,...,xn)\ and \Pn(xl,...,xn)-Qn(xl,...,xn)\ that
differ on a set of both P and Q positive probability. In other words, without countable
generation, the distance norm and hence the convergence properties Q and P will not be
invariant to our choice of Pn and Qn. The question then arises: if given P", some choices of
Q" converge to P" and some do not, has there been a "merging of opinions?"
For the discrete a -algebra and so for all a -algebras on Nu {oo} .12
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